With less than two weeks left before voting closes in the TCDC local elections at the time of writing, the early voter return figures in Thames-Coromandel tell a sobering story:
Less than 20 per cent of voters have responded so far. In individual wards, the returns range from around 13 per cent to a little over 20 per cent.
Reflecting a persistent challenge in New Zealand, local body elections continue to suffer from low engagement and apathy. Historically, this district has fared better than others — in 2022, nearly 52 per cent of eligible voters cast ballots locally versus a national average of 42 per cent.
One idea often floated to counter this decline is to shift to online voting.
Could allowing people to cast their local election ballot via smartphone boost participation in communities like Thames-Coromandel and Hauraki? The concept has intuitive appeal — convenience, accessibility, and is one that would appeal to younger voters.
Proponents argue that online voting reduces logistical barriers. Voters and those seeking office don’t need to be at the mercy of tardy postal providers. Ballots can be submitted 24/7, from anywhere.
That might especially help rural districts like those on the Coromandel Peninsula and Hauraki, where postal delays or distance to council vote boxes definitely deter participation.
Internationally, some jurisdictions have piloted internet voting to reach diaspora communities or citizens with disabilities. In Estonia, online voting has become mainstream, and over half of their ballots are cast electronically.
Operationally, digital systems can expedite counting, reduce manual errors, and streamline administrative costs — though often only after heavy upfront investment.
Security, transparency, and public trust are the central obstacles. The deployment of online voting must preserve ballot secrecy, guard against manipulation, cyberattacks, and ensure auditability.
In New South Wales, the iVote system was later found to contain verification flaws and vulnerabilities that could be leveraged to alter votes undetected.
A 2025 cryptographic analysis also warns that encrypted online voting may still leak sensitive information via metadata monitoring.
Moreover, a recent study in Policy Observatories argues that New Zealand has repeatedly considered online voting, enacting trials in 2016 and 2019, which were never implemented in part due to Internal Affairs concerns over integrity and costs, and remain shelved.
Given the low returns so far, both districts have reason to explore how better tools might help re-energise turnout. But rather than leaping straight to fully digital ballots, perhaps a phased approach, employing a hybrid model, may be the place to start.
The time for that experiment has come and gone for this year’s local elections; however, three years from now, serious conversations need to be had; otherwise, we risk undermining the very credibility of our democracy.
